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INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
recognizes that an accused has the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, thus implicitly limiting government power by
restricting the admission of non-confronted hearsay against an
1
2
accused. With Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme
3
Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts, and discarded its twenty-four-yearold “super-reliability” test for determining the constitutional
propriety of admitting hearsay against an accused at a criminal

† Distinguished Visiting Professor and Practitioner, University of Minnesota
Law School; Visiting Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Hans Grong for his inestimable help on this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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4

trial. Understanding the Confrontation Clause not as a substantive
5
evidential guarantee but as a procedural right to a fair trial, the
Crawford Court ruled that for hearsay to be admitted against a
defendant in a criminal trial, the declarant must be unavailable and
6
the hearsay must have been subjected to prior cross-examination.
This holding may be as close as the Court gets to establishing black
7
letter law in criminal procedural cases, for unavailability and prior
8
cross-examination is the only test, and it is a dispositive test.
9
This return to 1791 and original meaning occurred when the
10
analytical framework of Ohio v. Roberts had crumbled and when
Justices Scalia and Thomas had sufficiently explicated their
11
Founders’ Theory of constitutional decision-making in this area.
4. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right was held applicable
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (“We hold today that the Sixth Amendment’s right of an
accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and
is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
5. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is
to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee.”).
6. Id. at 59. The Court has defined “confrontation” to mean crossexamination. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895). See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (stating that the
Confrontation Clause requires a “prior opportunity for cross-examination”).
7. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 486 (1966).
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55–56 (“We do not read the historical sources to say
that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a
necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that
this requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish
reliability.”).
9. The Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791. Id. at 46.
10. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In the wake of Roberts, the Court interpreted the
decision increasingly narrowly, indicating a retreat from its conceptual
underpinnings. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (eschewing Roberts’
reliability analysis); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that introducing
testimony without the opportunity for cross-examination is a paradigmatic
violation of the Confrontation Clause); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–56
(1992) (holding that that the prosecution was not required to produce the fouryear-old victim of a sexual assault at trial or show the victim was unavailable before
the out-of-court statements of the child could be admitted); id. at 362 n.1
(Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing Roberts on historical grounds; joined by
Justice Scalia); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (“Roberts cannot
fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement
can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable.”).
11. See White, 502 U.S. at 353–54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the
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12

In short, the Crawford Court focused the Confrontation Clause
problem addressed in 1791, articulated the solution that the Court
concluded is the solution of 1791, and entrenched that solution in
13
criminal practice today.
But what exactly was the problem in 1791? Not the admission
of hearsay at a criminal trial, but the admission of “testimony” at a
14
The Sixth Amendment secures the right to be
criminal trial.
confronted with the witnesses against an accused, not the right to
15
confront anyone who happens to have said something relevant.
That is, Crawford reasoned, the Sixth Amendment is primarily, if
16
not solely, concerned with testimonial hearsay.
En route to its holding that testimonial hearsay is categorically
inadmissible in a criminal trial against a defendant unless the
17
18
declarant is unavailable and the testimony was subjected to prior
conflict between the text of the clause and the historical cases in which it was
originally interpreted; suggesting that the Court ought to revisit the “witness
against” precedents in light of the historical understanding of the clause). See also
Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concurring in the judgment based on
the rationale set forth by Justice Thomas in White).
12. Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor concurred in the judgment, but would
not have overruled Roberts. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (2004).
13. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (discussing “[o]ur
Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches . . .”). The common
law tradition at issue in confrontation cases is that of “live testimony in court
subject to adversarial testing.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
14. “[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.” Id.
at 51. Rather, the Sixth Amendment’s core concern is with specific types of out-ofcourt statements: testimonial statements, which Crawford describes as ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent; extrajudicial statements contained in
formalized testimonial materials; statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 51–52.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
17. The Court has yet to define what “unavailability” means for purposes of
Crawford analysis. What the Court has said is that unavailability under Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(a) provides little insight into whether a witness is “available” for
purposes of being subject to cross-examination under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(C). United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988) (“Quite
obviously, the two characterizations are made for two entirely different purposes
and there is no requirement or expectation that they should coincide.”).
Regardless of the characterization of unavailability, the Owens court held the
admission of clearly testimonial hearsay from a declarant “unavailable” for Federal
Rule of Evidence 804 purposes but subject to cross-examination for Federal Rule
of Evidence 801 purposes did not violate the Confrontation Clause. See id.
18. Crawford is adamant that the cross-examination be “prior” crossexamination as opposed to prior statements subjected to cross-examination at
trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (“Our cases have thus remained faithful to the
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cross-examination, the Court identified one possible exception to
its categorical rule: dying declarations.
The one deviation we have found involves dying
declarations. The existence of that exception as a general
rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.
Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial,
there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are.
We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial
dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on
19
historical grounds, it is sui generis.
This article asks why testimonial dying declarations might be
an exception to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
20
Amendment.
There seem to be a few possible answers: (1) because dying
declarations are so reliable that the Sixth Amendment’s concern
that the reliability of testimonial statements be “tested in the
21
22
crucible of cross-examination” is not raised; (2) because dying
23
declarations are self-confronted; (3) because no dying declaration
can be testimonial (and thus does not present a Sixth Amendment
24
25
problem); (4) because the Founders said so.
Before considering these four possibilities, I will make a
preliminary comment on dying declarations under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and offer a summary review of Crawford
Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial
have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”); id. at 68 (“[T]he Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”). A plain reading of Crawford demonstrates
that the admission against an accused of an in-court witness’s prior testimonial
hearsay statements, made at a time when the accused did not have the opportunity
to confront those statements by cross-examination, would violate the Sixth
Amendment even though the witness is presently available to be confronted about
those prior statements.
19. Id. at 56 n.6 (citations omitted).
20. Nontestimonial hearsay, including nontestimonial dying declarations,
may be exempt from Confrontation Clause analysis altogether. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 61.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. Testimony dying declarations might also be an exception to the
Confrontation Clause because the Founders understood so and the Court in 2004
said so. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also infra Part
III.D.
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principles.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Dying Declarations Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) defines what we
commonly refer to as a “dying declaration” as the statement of an
unavailable declarant made under the belief of impending death:
Statements under belief of impending death. In a
prosecution for a homicide or in a civil action or
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while
believing that the declarant’s death was imminent,
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
26
declarant believed to be impending death.
Rule 804(a) requires a finding of unavailability before 804(b)’s
exception may be used, and for the purposes of this article we must
assume that the unavailability at issue is the death of the declarant.
Unless the declarant died and the ensuing prosecution of the
27
defendant is for homicide, the 804(b)(2) exception is not
28
available in criminal cases.
The constitutional question is raised when a dying declaration
as defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) is offered against
an accused in a homicide case and the statement is testimonial in
29
nature.
26. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
27. The question of whether the homicide prosecution must be for the death
of the declarant is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that there are
few decisions on this issue. Generally, dying declarations are admissible only in
cases of homicide where the declarant’s death is the subject of the homicide
charge. There are, however, state cases where the admissibility is not confined to
situations in which the declarant’s death is at issue, but extends to any situation in
which the circumstances of the declarant’s death is relevant to any issue. See, e.g.,
State v. Lester, 240 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1978). Typically, these cases present the odd
situation where the accused is on trial for the murder of two or more persons, and
the admissibility of a dying declaration of one of the deceased persons is at issue
for both charges or in the trial for the homicide of the non-declarant. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Key, 407 N.E.2d 327 (Mass. 1980); State v. Harding, 230 S.E.2d
397 (N.C. 1976).
28. The rule is different in civil cases; although these require the
unavailability of the declarant, that unavailability need not be the death of the
declarant (at least, not by the time of trial). FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
29. This situation, of course, gives rise to the possibility that how the
Founders understood dying declarations may be somewhat different from how the
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B. Crawford Summary
In 1980, the Court confronted, yet again, the question of
whether the admission of hearsay against an accused always violates
the Sixth Amendment or whether exceptions to the rule excluding
30
In
hearsay are also exceptions to the Sixth Amendment.
response, the Court announced the “super-reliability” test in
31
The holding is, essentially, a tautology: if hearsay is
Roberts.
sufficiently reliable that its admission would not violate the Sixth
Amendment, then the Sixth Amendment is not violated by its
32
admission because it is sufficiently reliable. Put in the language of
the case, we can say that where a declarant is unavailable, hearsay
may be admitted without violating the Sixth Amendment if the
relevant hearsay exception is “firmly-rooted” or, if not, that the
relevant hearsay exception provides circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to those provided by the firmly-rooted
Federal Rules of Evidence define dying declarations. See infra Part III. Embedded
in this proposition is another issue: whether the Confrontation Clause is
concerned only with testimonial hearsay or also with non-hearsay but testimonial
statements. In the heart of the Crawford analysis, the Court discusses the “specific
type of out-of-court statement” about which the Sixth Amendment is concerned.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“Various formulations of this
core class of ‘testimonial’ statements exist . . . .”) (emphasis added). At the
conclusion of his decision for the Court, Justice Scalia refers neither to testimonial
hearsay nor testimonial statements, but to testimonial evidence. Id. at 68 (“Where
testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”) (emphasis added). By way of example, consider the following
scenario: a co-conspirator approaches someone he knows to be an undercover
police officer and says: “We have some great narcotics moving through the city
tonight. We need some help from ‘inside.’ You interested? You could make a lot
of money helping us out.” Arguably, that is a statement made during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and,
thus, defined as non-hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). But it is also a
testimonial statement in that it was “made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe . . . would be available for use at a later
trial,” should the declarant have guessed wrongly as to the corruptibility of the
officer. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. If Crawford is limited to testimonial “hearsay,”
then the only issue preventing this statement from being introduced against an
accused (assuming the declarant is unavailable) would be whether the Founders
considered co-conspirator statements non-hearsay. If the holding of Crawford is
not limited to testimonial hearsay, but includes testimonial statements or testimonial
evidence, then admission of the statement at issue here might well violate the Sixth
Amendment. Conjecturing potential resolutions to this issue is beyond the scope
of this article.
30. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 57.
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33

exceptions.
Almost immediately, confusion arose about the meaning of the
Court’s decision in Roberts.
For example, the unavailability
34
requirement of Roberts was discarded in United States v. Inadi. Inadi
suggested that Roberts applied only to the facts of that case: prior
testimony situations, where the Federal Rules of Evidence required
35
unavailability as an evidentiary prerequisite to admission. Inadi
itself addressed the co-conspirator situation, where a showing of
36
unavailability had never been required. In 1987, Bourjaily seemed
to accept that Roberts applied to all hearsay offered against an
accused but provided the requirements of a firmly-rooted Federal
37
Rules of Evidence hearsay exception were satisfied. If they were,
38
admission would be insulated against constitutional challenge.
39
White v. Illinois stated that Roberts unavailability analysis is only
required when the declarant’s statements were made in a prior
40
judicial proceeding.
Perhaps the quintessential example of the conceptual mess
41
created by Roberts is Lilly v. Virginia. The case involved statements
against penal interest and produced no single opinion joined by a
42
majority of the Justices. Although the Court unanimously voted to
reverse, a four-three split developed over the extent to which
defendant-inculpatory accomplice statements may fall within a
33. The “firmly-rooted” hearsay exceptions have been held to include coconspirator statements. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (“We
think that these cases demonstrate that co-conspirators’ statements, when made in
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being
outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion.”). Roberts itself dealt with
prior testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)—a defense witness
testified unfavorably at a preliminary hearing; when the witness proved to be
unavailable at trial, the prosecution offered the preliminary hearing testimony
which, of course, the defendant had had an opportunity to confront. See Roberts,
448 U.S. at 56. It is interesting to note that though the Court overruled Roberts in
Crawford, the result of Roberts would be the same under Crawford. Idaho v. Wright
provides an example of what is not a firmly rooted exception: Federal Rule of
Evidence 807. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 805 (1990) (rejecting Idaho’s
residual hearsay exception as firmly-rooted for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause).
34. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
35. See id. at 400.
36. See id.
37. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171, 182.
38. Id.
39. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
40. Id. at 353–54.
41. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
42. Id.
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firmly-rooted hearsay exception, and over the extent to which the
declarant’s statements might be separated out into admissible
43
Justices
inculpatory and inadmissible self-serving statements.
Scalia and Thomas concurred in the result, noting that the
Confrontation Clause was only concerned with testimonial
44
statements.
Suffice it to say that the focus on testimonial statements in
Justices Scalia and Thomas’s opinions in White and Lilly evolved
into the majority holding in Crawford. Those opinions are rooted in
an understanding of “1791 Theory,” and have held firm in the two
45
major post-Crawford decisions issued prior to the publication of
46
47
this article: Davis v. Washington and Giles v. California. Justice
Scalia wrote both opinions, and both reflect a strong originalist
approach to constitutional decision-making. Davis did not contain
a dissenting opinion, though Justice Thomas concurred on even
48
narrower historical grounds. In Giles, the majority held together
over the 1791 understanding of forfeiture of Sixth Amendment
49
confrontation rights, but not without disagreement.
III. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
For ease in discussing the four alternative explanations for a
Sixth Amendment exception for testimonial dying declarations
(what we might call the praeter jus status of testimonial dying
declarations), let us posit the following scenario: an undercover
police officer infiltrates a gang. His identity is discovered and he is
murdered by the gang leader. Suspecting something is amiss,
other officers locate the dying undercover officer who says to them,
recognizing them to be his colleagues in law enforcement:
“Lieutenant, I know I’m dying. I don’t have long. They figured

43. See id. at 120.
44. See id. at 143 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring).
45. There are two Crawford retroactivity cases, both of which fall outside the
issues discussed in this article. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008);
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
46. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
47. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). On November 10, 2008, the Court heard
arguments in another confrontation case. The decision in that case is still
pending. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
48. Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688, 2691–93. See also id. at 2695 (Souter, J.,
concurring, joined by Ginsberg, J.); id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens and Kennedy, JJ.)
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out who I was and the gang leader shot me. I hope you catch the
son-of-a-bitch. He’s probably headed to his girlfriend’s house at
101 West Main Street. The gun he used is a thirty-eight caliber
Beretta with a pearl handle.” Whereupon the officer expires. The
gang leader is apprehended at his girlfriend’s house and
prosecuted for the murder of the undercover officer. At the time
of the suspect’s arrest, he is in possession of a thirty-eight caliber
Beretta with a pearl handle.
A. Dying Declarations Are So Reliable That the Sixth Amendment’s
Concern for the Reliability of Evidence Is Not Raised
A review of common law sources would seem to support the
proposition that dying declarations are so reliable that the Sixth
Amendment is not offended by their admission against an accused.
50
For example, in Rex v. Woodcock, the court stated that
Now the general principle on which [dying declarations
are] admitted is, that they are declarations made in
51
extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and
when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive
to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a
situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered by the law
as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by
52
a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.
The problem with the Supreme Court accepting this
53
approach, which has obvious and intuitive appeal, is that it would
50. Rex v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (L.R.C.C.R.).
51. Canon law made a distinction between “in the moment of death” (in
articulo mortis) and “in danger of death” (in periculo mortis). See JAMES T. BRETZKE,
CONSECRATED PHRASES: A LATIN THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 61–64 (2003). In articulo
mortis “[r]efers to the imminent danger of death (usually due to illness or serious
injury).” Id. at 61. In periculo mortis had “an important legal distinction in that it
applies not only to those who are physically near death but also includes those
who, due to circumstances like war or natural disasters, might also be in some
danger of death.” Id. at 64.
52. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
53. In the oral argument for Giles v. California, Justice Scalia suggested that
dying declarations are simply outside Sixth Amendment boundaries because of
their reliability. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *12–13, Giles v. Washington,
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 1803647 (“And the evidence of
truthfulness [of a dying declaration] was apparently that the person was about to
enter the next world . . . [a]nd most of us don’t lie at that particular moment.
Whereas, in the Confrontation Clause situation you have a totally different
situation.”).
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signal a return to Ohio v. Roberts, something the Court has been
54
clear it does not intend to do.
Considering our scenario, if a court can find as a matter of fact
(by, for example, a preponderance of the evidence, a standard
often applied by the Court to preliminary finding of fact on
evidentiary rulings when it concludes it should articulate a standard
55
at all) that all of the dying officer’s statements are “statement[s]
made . . . while believing that . . . death was imminent, concerning
the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be
56
impending death,” then it should be “super-reliable” and
admissible. The Court could have made this ruling under Roberts,
especially if this represented the common law’s approach to dying
declarations. But if Roberts is no longer available for consideration,
then the Crawford Court would likely deny certiorari, if the “superreliability” theory was the reason the Founders would have
considered dying declarations exempt from Sixth Amendment
analysis.
In short, Justice Scalia has risked painting himself into the
proverbial corner by mentioning that dying declarations are sui
57
generis exceptions to the Sixth Amendment. If the exception rests
on an understanding that dying declarations are “super-reliable,”
then—testimonial or not—this exception would seem to be more
in line with the reasoning of Roberts than with Crawford. Or is there
another reason why this exception exists, if it does?

54. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (“We decline to approve an exception to
the Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the founding or for 200 years
thereafter.”). Justice Scalia has also put a fine point on this during oral
arguments. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *11, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 076053), 2008 WL 1803647 (Scalia, J.) (“But we did say that the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause is the meaning it bore when the people adopted it.”);
Transcript of Oral Argument at *23, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, (No. 07591), 2008 WL 4892843 (Scalia, J.) (“I am interested in the history since that’s
what the Court held in Crawford, that the content of the Confrontation Clause is
not what we would like it to be, but what it historically was when it was enshrined
in the Constitution.”).
55. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (“We are . . .
guided by our prior decisions regarding admissibility determinations that hinge on
preliminary factual questions. We have traditionally required that these matters
be established by a preponderance of proof.”).
56. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
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B. Dying Declarations Are Self-Confronted
Is it possible that dying declarations may have been considered
self-confronted? That is to say, because the dying person was about
to meet his (or her) maker, that him-(or her-) self (or The Maker
Him-, Her-, or Itself) would in effect be the confrontational
presence testing the truth of the dying person’s declarations. The
cultural normative concerns about such a less secular super58
reliability thesis aside, if this were the case the Court would hardly
refer to dying declarations as “exceptions” to the Sixth
Amendment. They would, in effect, be subject to the Sixth
Amendment. And as it is not the defendant who is doing the
59
confronting, this argument (if it rises to the level of an argument)
is but an alternate way of ensuring reliability, not by testing in the
60
“crucible of cross-examination,” but by testing in the crucible of
death and the afterlife.
The entire statement in our scenario would likely pass such a
bare “statement made at the moment of death” test. Even if this
were the Founders’ understanding, it would seem to gut Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) of any particular meaning and, for that
reason alone, would not be a likely resolution to the question of
why dying declarations might be exceptions to the Sixth
Amendment.
C. No Dying Declaration Can Be Testimonial
Footnote six in Crawford begs this question because it refers
61
explicitly to testimonial dying declarations. Nevertheless, could
that reference be inaccurate?
Might dying declarations as
58. If the Constitution entrenches relevant common law provisions, see
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (“Our Constitution and the
common-law traditions it entrenches . . . .”), what does that mean? If dying
declarations, as understood by the Founders, were recognized as an exception to
the Sixth Amendment because of the accepted religious beliefs of the time, are
those beliefs “entrenched,” i.e., normative, today, or does an empty formalism
merely provide an arbitrary rule of evidence?
59. In his oral argument in Melendez-Diaz, Jeffrey Fisher suggested that the
relevant issue was whether the defendant, not someone else, is confronting the
witness. Transcript of Oral Argument at *17, Melendez-Diaz, (No. 07-591), 2008 WL
4892843. “It’s, again, for the defendant to decide and not for the court to decide
whether cross-examination would be useful.” Id.
60. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
61. Id. at 56 n.6 (“The one deviation we have found involves dying
declarations.”).
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understood by the Founders exclude testimonial statements?
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2), the undercover
officer’s statement in our hypothetical scenario arguably qualifies
as a dying declaration. Assuming the veracity of the officer (that he
sincerely apprehends his imminent death), the officer’s statement
that he knows his death is imminent and that on being discovered
to be a police officer, the gang leader shot him with a pearl
handled thirty-eight caliber Beretta, would qualify as a statement
“made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
62
declarant believed to be impending death.”
But would that have been considered a dying declaration by
the Founders, for whom dying declarations focused not on revenge
or apprehension of wrongdoers, but on the overwhelming fact of
the awareness that one was dying? These were statements made not
just in danger of death (in periculo mortis), but at the point of death
(in articulo mortis), and it was death, not some other altruistic
concern, that caused the mind to be “induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so
awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to
that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of
63
Justice.”
If a distinction between non-testimonial and testimonial dying
declarations can be made, between evidentiary dying declarations
and Sixth Amendment dying declarations respectively, then we
64
would be able to say that footnote six in Crawford is inaccurate. To
the extent a dying declaration is non-testimonial, it would pose no
Sixth Amendment concern, but to the extent it was testimonial,
65
then it would not be acceptable under Crawford.
But this is not to identify a partial exception to the Sixth
Amendment. It is, rather, to note the obvious: that non-testimonial
dying declarations present no constitutional issues.
“Where
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
62. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). Out of an abundance of caution and consistent
with the purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the trial court should redact the
declarant’s wish and inference that the gang leader be apprehended at the
girlfriend’s house.
63. R v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (L.R.C.C.R.).
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
65. Because, following Giles, the Court would have to “decline to approve an
exception to the Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the founding or
for 200 years thereafter.” Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
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Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development
of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
66
altogether.” Under this approach, testimonial dying declarations
would no more be exempt from Sixth Amendment testing that any
other testimonial hearsay.
Addressing our scenario, a critical fact issue would arise for the
trial court: whether the dying officer’s statement was made in
contemplation of death or in contemplation of prosecution. If the
former, it would be a non-testimonial and admissible hearsay
statement; if the latter, it would be a testimonial and therefore
inadmissible hearsay statement. If it is possible that the statement
might be made both in contemplation of death and in the hope of
a successful prosecution, then further questions arise: to what
extent is it one or the other? To what extent would the Founders
have understood a dying declaration to be made in the hope of a
criminal prosecution and still be a statement made “when every
67
hope of this world is gone[?]”
D. Dying Declarations Do Not Present Sixth Amendment Problems Because
the Founders Said (or Understood) So
The fourth approach to the question of whether dying
declarations are sui generis exceptions to the Sixth Amendment is
simply this: dying declarations, like death, are different. For
whatever reason they did so, the Founders accepted the fact that
dying declarations were not subject to “testing in the crucible of
cross-examination,” and therefore, we likewise do not subject them
to cross-examination.
That is to say, it is possible that the Court today could rule that
dying declarations are sui generis exceptions to the Sixth
Amendment simply because the Founders would have understood
dying declarations to be exceptions to the Sixth Amendment, and
not to inquire into why that might be so. This would avoid a
problem hinted at earlier, whether the cultural reasons for the
Founders’ acceptance of dying declarations might be rooted in the
religious understanding of the time (which is undoubtedly
68
reflected in the common law tradition). Because the common law
66.
67.
68.

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
See, e.g., supra Part III.B.
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tradition known in 1791 is “entrenched by our constitution,” an
argument suggests itself that the cultural norms existing in 1791
remain, as a constitutional matter, cultural norms today.
In short, a ruling on the evidentiary and constitutional
questions raised by our scenario might be as follows: should a trial
court find that the evidentiary predicate for 804(b)(2) admission
exists as a matter of fact, then the Sixth Amendment would pose no
barrier to the admission of the dying declaration because the
Founders would have likewise barred their admission, and no
further explanation is necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have raised the question as to why dying declarations might
be understood to be, as the Court suggests, sui generis exceptions to
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. We have summarized
the shift in jurisprudence from super-reliability to crossexamination as the test for the constitutionally acceptable
admission of testimonial hearsay against homicide defendants. We
have looked at four possible approaches to the praeter jus status of
dying declarations, and we see that the problem of dying
declarations and the Sixth Amendment highlights a fundamental
weakness of Justice Scalia’s “1791 jurisprudence.” The weakness is
also at its strength: it is over-simple in a complex and pluralistic,
multi-cultural society. However simple it makes the task of
constitutional interpretation, it cannot make the world simple
70
merely by demanding it be so.
69. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (“Our Constitution and
the common-law traditions it entrenches . . .”).
69.
Justice Scalia’s Crawford-based jurisprudence may, however, signal a
return to the jurisprudence of dissent primarily authored by Justices Stephens,
Marshall, Brennan, and sometimes, Blackmun. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) (“This case poses fundamental questions about our system of justice. As
this Court has long recognized, and reaffirmed only weeks ago, ‘ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.’”). Id. at 434 (Stephens, J.,
dissenting); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)
(“[I]t is unseemly and unjust for the Government to beggar those it prosecutes in
order to disable their defense at trial.”) Id. at 635 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Crawford and its progeny recognize the centrality of the defense lawyer in an
accusatorial, adversarial system. “To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to
ensure the reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner, by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”)
541 U.S. at 61–62. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
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So we end where we began: with an observation and a
question: dying declarations may, like grey-eyed Athena springing
71
fully armed from the head of Zeus, be self-generating, and also
72
like Athena may be outside the Sixth Amendment. In Athena’s
case, we likely know the answer why. In the case of dying
73
declarations, the question remains. Why?
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”) Id. at 596.
71. HESIOD, THEOGONY 924 (Apostolos Athanassakis trans., Johns Hopkins
University Press 1983).
72. However significant the acts of the gods may be in other disciplines, they
are irrelevant to questions of constitutional law. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 170 (1986) (holding Miranda protects defendants’ rights under the Fifth
Amendment, and does not go any further).
73. On April 7, 2008, the Kenosha County (Wisconsin) Circuit Court issued
an opinion in State v. Jensen, discussing whether, under Crawford, a letter
containing testimonial hearsay, written November 21, 1998, could be admitted as a
dying declaration in a prosecution for a homicide committed on December 3,
1998. 727 N.W.2d 518, 529 (Wis. 2007) (holding that the letter was written, given
to a neighbor to be delivered to specific police officers in the event of the
declarant’s death and, according to the Kenosha County Circuit Court, “ratified”
by not having been withdrawn by the victim.) Seeming to confuse the evidentiary
issue with the constitutional issue, the court determined that this “timed letter . . .
must be analyzed not by the flawed imminence-focused rule of the modern era,
but in the light of the common law rule which existed at the time that the Framers
adopted the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Jensen, 02-CF-0314 at 16 (Kenosha Cty.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2008) (unpublished, http://www.personal. umich.edu/
~rdfrdman/JensenDyingDec.pdf) (last visited Mar. 16, 2009). That common law
rule was rooted in a medieval English understanding of religion and the medieval
maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri (no one who is dying is presumed to lie).
That is to say, the present Wisconsin evidentiary rule, which requires temporal and
subject matter links between the declaration and the dying (“[a] statement made
by the declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent,
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the
declarant’s impending death.”) should nonetheless be understood according to
the common law in 1791. WIS. STAT. ANN. 908.045(3) (West 2000). But there is
nothing in Crawford that requires this. What Crawford requires is not that the
evidentiary rule but that the Sixth Amendment be understood as it was in 1791.
Thus, it is probable that some dying declarations might pass constitutional muster
only to be excluded because of the requirements of the relevant rules of evidence.
The Sixth Amendment issue arises after a court has found a testimonial hearsay
statement admissible as a matter of evidentiary law, not before. But the Kenosha
County Circuit Court is adamant that the common law rule in existence in 1791
controls both the constitutional and evidentiary issues, regardless of the current
understanding of the premises on which it rests. The court thus ignores another
medieval maxim: cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex (the reason for the law having
ceased, so also the law ceases). The court states: “Crawford teaches that in
analyzing the extent of the Confrontation Clause, a court must look to the
[evidence] Rule as it existed in 1791, not to how it has eroded to its present form.”
Jenson at 10–11, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rdfrdman/
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Might it be that, over two hundred years since the ratification
of the Sixth Amendment, the Anglo-American tradition still finds—
and should expect to find—testimonial truth at the moment of
death?

JensenDyingDec.pdf. By failing to distinguish the evidentiary rule from the
constitutional principle, the Wisconsin court effectively held (1) that dying
declarations in Wisconsin in 2008 should be understood in light of the medieval
maxim that a dying person is presumed not to lie, and (2) that dying declarations
are exceptions to the Confrontation Clause because the Founders said so,
regardless of why they said so. Because of the important role dying declarations
play in many homicide prosecutions, especially domestic violence homicides, it
may take yet another Supreme Court confrontation decision before we gain a
meaningful understanding of dying declarations then and now, and their
relationship to the Sixth Amendment. Without understanding the relationship of
dying declarations at common law to dying declarations today, and of both to the
Sixth Amendment, rulings such as the Kenosha County ruling in Jensen amount to
little more than judicial fiat.
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